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ABSTRACT The exponential growth of the blockchain size has become a major contributing factor that
hinders the decentralisation of blockchain and its potential implementations in data-heavy applications.
In this paper, we propose segment blockchain, an approach that segmentises blockchain and enables nodes to
only store a copy of one blockchain segment. We use PoW as a membership threshold to limit the number of
nodes taken by anAdversary—theAdversary can only gain atmost n/2 of nodes in a network of n nodeswhen
it has 50% of the calculation power in the system (the Nakamoto blockchain security threshold). A segment
blockchain system fails when an Adversary stores all copies of a segment, because the Adversary can then
leave the system, causing a permanent loss of the segment. We theoretically prove that segment blockchain
can sustain a (AD/n)m failure probability when the Adversary has no more than AD number of nodes and
every segment is stored by m number of nodes. The storage requirement is mostly shrunken compared to the
traditional design and therefore making the blockchain more suitable for data-heavy applications.
INDEX TERMS Distributed processing, edge computing, content distribution networks, distributed man-
agement, blockchain, blockchain storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the anonymous and autonomous society like a blockchain
system, every record should be re-derivable. This feature
forms the essential trust of the blockchain, and secures the
blockchain; thus, keeping every history transaction is critical.
However, the size of the Nakamoto blockchain (Bitcoin [1])
has grown from the ground to over 226 Gbytes in the past ten
years from January 2009 to June 2019; the size doubled since
the February 2017 (at slightly over 100 Gbytes) [2]. If the
exponential growth to be continued, we are expecting 1.5 to
1.6 TBytes in Jan 2021, 3 to 3.2 TBytes in Jan 2022. Parallel to
the growth of blockchain size, the storage cost of being a full
node (the node which stores all the blocks of the mainchain)
in the Bitcoin network is also grown in exponential.
It holds the promise that, through the usage of blockchain,
complex and data-demanding jobs can be distributed through
predefined protocols (usually through smart contracts
[3]–[5]) to the anonymous nodes throughout the network,
and the majority consensus can secure the job results.
Ideally, an alternative-finance system can be built upon—
the job publisher pays the system to do tasks, while the
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Rashid Mehmood .
anonymous nodes in the system get paid by generating the
commonly recognised task results [3]. It is guaranteed by
the decentralisation and anonymous nature of blockchain
that as long as the security threshold—the Adversary not
having more than half of the participated calculation power
is sustained, the results recognised by the majority are the
correct results [1]. However, the oversize problem increases
the bar of storage requirement for participants, making the
system hard to process data-heavy applications like train-
ing Artificial Intelligence video recognition models [6], [7]
distributedly and decentralisedly if the system remains uni-
versally joinable. Ordinary devices simply do not have
enough space to store the data, and the system becomes
increasingly centralised if the system process those applica-
tions. A transaction in Bitcoin and other Distributed Ledgers
[3], [8] sized only around several hundreds of bytes. Even
with such little usage of data, disadvantaged nodes are grad-
ually leaving the mining game of most Distributed Ledger
systems. More and more devices are acting in lightweight
mode [9], [10] or join in mining pools [11], [12] for the
reason of both lacking calculation advantage and the space
for storing the blockchain.
Many flavours of approaches like weighted models [9],
[10], [13], off-chain [14], [15], blockchain sharding [16]–[18]
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are proposed in recent researches to improve the per-
formance of the blockchain. Many approaches attempt
to ease the burden of individual nodes and solve the
dilemma among having the ability to process everything,
maintaining the decentralised system and increasing the
performance.
For weighted models, the winning chance in the min-
ing game and the duty of a node are different by weights.
The lightweight node system [9], [10] is an example of the
weighted model. A lightweight node does not store any block
but is the client of some full nodes. They require relevant
transactions from the full node to verify a new transac-
tion using Simple Payment Verification (SPV) inquires [19].
A lightweight node only takes up to 4.2M Bytes per year,
regardless of the total size of blockchain [19], but it cannot
verify the new blocks and can be misled by full nodes.
In Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [8], people elect a fixed
number of representatives and contribute their stakes to these
representatives; these representatives then compete in the
game of PoS [20]. DPoS has excellent performance because
the representative nodes usually have a superpower regarding
calculation ability, storage, and network bandwidth. These
models are now commonly used inmany blockchain-powered
IoT systems [21], [22], where lightweight nodes are at the
edge, or the nodes contribute their stakes to DPoS to function
the system. Because the use of authoritarian/superior nodes,
the systems are potential-centralised and the system security
highly depends on these representatives.
For off-chain approaches, the relevant persons publish
a co-signed contract at the beginning and the end of the
relationship. Then they do the trading securely through off-
chain channels [23], [24] without publishing transactions to
the blockchain. They only publish the transactions to the
blockchainwhen one violates the off-chain transactions. They
need to monitor the blockchain to detect any violations; thus,
it is not desirable for users who may go offline. And, there are
few usages of off-chain approaches in non-financial related
applications. Instead of broadcasting the task and the task
result to the network, the entities who use off-chain methods
must communicate in private, and this also compromises the
anonymous nature of the blockchain.
For blockchain sharding approaches, they distribute nodes
into different shards and divide the storage as well as the jobs
to different shards which runs in parallel so that generally
the work demand for individual nodes are not increased with
the increase of transaction per second globally. Blockchain
sharding is designed for applications that require high con-
currency and high transaction per second. The design of
blockchain sharding approaches mainly focuses on lowering
the chance for the Adversary to occupy the majority spots
in a shard when the Adversary has taken a relatively large
population of nodes but has not taken the majority nodes
globally. It is possible for the Adversary not having a security
threshold number of nodes globally but controlled a shard,
then the security of the system as a whole is compromised.
In order to maintain the security of the system, there are very
strict requirements over the number of shards and the number
of nodes inside a shard [18].
We see some blockchain-based storage systems proposed
in recent years [25]–[33], for most cases, the blockchain
is only used as the ‘‘contract-signing witness’’ between
the data publisher and the data keeper. Approaches so far
are not trying to reduce the size of the blockchain itself
and thus cannot avoid the storage pattern of Bitcoin. Not
to mention, the nodes not only need to store the transac-
tion (the contract between the data-publisher and the data-
keeper), they also need to keep some data published by the
data-publishers.
In this paper, we show a new blockchain structure that
cut the blockchain into parts. We use blocks as the input to
update the states of the ledger. Once a block is accepted,
the transactions inside are executed, and then a new state is
derived basing on the old one. In Bitcoin case, a state is the
balance of every wallet address. A fixed number of blocks
are placed into a segment; a segment is stored by different
nodes and is retrieved by a user only when the user wants
to re-derive a state. The nodes keep the latest state so that
they can verify the new transactions. They also need to keep
a segment assigned by the system to participate in the mining
game. In this model, the Adversary may attempt to cause a
permanent loss of a specific blockchain segment by storing
all the copies of a blockchain segment and then disappear
from the network once succeed. The Adversary may also
attempt to deceive the system by claiming it stores a part of
the blockchain which it does not store.
Segment blockchain dynamically divides the blockchain
into h//s segments following the sequence of blockchain.
It requires nodes to show a PoW (Proof of Work) [34], [35]
when joining in the system as well as every time the nodes
present the evidence of storing to the system. In this way,
we avoid the Sybil attack [36] and make sure that the Adver-
sary can only take up to n/2 of nodes if it has 50% of the
overall calculation power. We use a hypothesis taken from
our recent blockchain sharding research [18] to label different
nodes in Segment blockchain. We categories the participated
nodes into different classes and ensures every part of the
blockchain is stored by one node per class. Nodes gain the
reward for keeping the blockchain segments in the edited
game of mining.
Instead of using that hypothesis to build a blockchain
sharding system that is more focusing on the improvement
of transaction per second, Segment blockchain concentrates
solely on the reduce of blockchain size. In blockchain shard-
ing systems, the honest nodes must be the majority of every
shard to keep the security of the system as a whole. How-
ever, considering storage, when an Adversary fails to become
the keeper of every copy of a Segment, its attack does not
succeed. So that, in segment blockchain, we do not require
the honest people to be the majority of the people who store
a specific segment, we only need to ensure that every seg-
ment gets at least a reliable keeper. With the loose security
threshold, we can assign less number of nodes to store a
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TABLE 1. Court schedule.
segment in order to keep that segment securely, compared to
blockchain sharding systems where they need to secure the
majority nodes are honest. That is why the storage can be
much shrunken.
Segment blockchain is suitable for most blockchain appli-
cations nowadays including notation [37], identity con-
trol [38], multinational customs record exchange [39] which
applications do not require a large transaction throughput
(like ten thousand to 1 million per second), but get benefit
from decentralisation. It also helps the implementation of
blockchain in IoT environment where the edge devices are
lacking storage capacity to keep the full record; meanwhile,
the systems are not requiring significant transaction per sec-
ond [40]. Segment blockchain can even be used to improve
the blockchain sharding by separating transaction storage
from transaction verification: the nodes in shards only keep
the latest state in their shards, and the history transactions
are placed into Segments and being handled separately by
Segment blockchain.
In the following sections, we will show the Segment
blockchain in detail, discuss why our method is secured
and can provide a (AD/n)m failure probability; also, how
the model prevents the spoof of storing. We will also show
the data requirement compared to the traditional Nakamoto
blockchain (Bitcoin).
II. THE JURY HYPOTHESIS AND ITS USAGE IN SEGMENT
BLOCKCHAIN
We proposed the Jury Hypothesis as an analogy of an
n/2 Byzantine-node tolerate blockchain sharding approach
in [18], which turns the blockchain into multiple committees
that run in parallel.
The Jury Hypothesis states that the member of the Jury
of a court comes from the diverse background, so that when
a verdict is reached, it can be seen as the decision reached
from the whole society (every class of people). If it takes m
different occupations to form a jury, then when there are a s
number of court hearings run in parallel, there are s number
of people in each one of the m occupation. Table 1 shows a
court schedule; each court represents a shard, A is a person
controlled by the Adversary while H is an honest person.
It is ruled that a verdict is reached when a pre-defined T ,
T > 0.5m number of people inside the jury reached a consen-
sus. Assuming there exists a random assignment scheme that
assigns people of the same occupation to different courtrooms
where different court hearings are taken place in parallel.
Then, the chance for the Adversary to gain T spots inside the
target courtroom is (assuming the Adversary put all its nodes
into the front T occupations)
Pr[T ] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
(1)
where Ai is the number of people inside courtroom i who are
controlled by the Adversary. To derive the maximised Pr[T ],
we want
∏T
i=1 Ai to be maximised because s is the same. Let
the Adversary has AD number of people inside the system
(Court Jury Schedule), then AD =∑mi=1 Ai. To maximise the
value of
∏T
i=1 Ai, we consider
Ai = bAD/T c, i ∈ [1,T − 1] (2)
AT = bAD/T c + AD mod T (3)
This scenario is the maximised because, given any positive
integer X ,
X ∗ X > (X − 1) ∗ (X + 1) = X ∗ X − 1 (4)
Thus,
Pr[T ]max ≈ ( ADT ∗ s )
T (5)
A. THE JURY HYPOTHESIS FOR SEGMENT BLOCKCHAIN
Let the jury of a court stores part of the blockchain, then for
the Adversary to control all the people (T = m) inside this
jury is
Pr[T ]max ≈ ( ADm ∗ s )
m (6)
Let the court system has a n number of jury members in
total (n = m ∗ s). Then,
Pr[m]max ≈ (ADn )
m (7)
If the Adverary has no more than 50% fraction of the
people inside the system (Nakamoto blockchain threshold),
then
Pr[T = m]max ≈ (12 )
m (8)
Thus, the maximum chance for a failure to occur is ( 12 )
m.
B. CHALLENGE
The challenge of implementing Jury Hypothesis for the
blockchain storage is (1) how to give different nodes different
occupations. (2) how to randomly assign storage to a node.
(3) how to prove that a node stores a data. (4) how to adjust
the membership and reform the jury when nodes go offline.
III. SEGMENT BLOCKCHAIN
Segment blockchain cuts the blockchain into segments. The
size and the number of blockchain segments are dynamically
adjusted base on the quantity and the occupation of nodes in
the system. Every node only stores one blockchain segment
and the block header of every block in the mainchain.
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FIGURE 1. An example of the block and state.
FIGURE 2. The example of the blockchain segments.
A. BLOCK AS INPUT
Let the blockchain be a state machine where every block
is the input of the current state; the machine reaches the
next state after processing the current block. In Segment
blockchain, every node keeps the latest state and all the block
headers while storing some copies of the previous blocks.
The blockchain is secured when a node can download all the
blocks, run them as inputs, and derive the same state. Figure 1
shows an example of this design.
In Bitcoin case, the state can be a ledger that records the
balance of every account.
B. BLOCKCHAIN SEGMENTS
Let there be s number of blockchain segments; every segment
takes h//s number of nodes following the index number of
the blocks and a state derived from the latest block of the
previous segment. h is the current length of the blockchain.
Except the last segment, other segments are of equal length.
The last segment would additionally contain h mod s blocks.
Figure 2 shows an example of this design.
C. NODE MEMBERSHIP
Let every block has a section which records the pending
nodes. The pending nodes are nodes which reported to the
system but has not yet been assigned with storage. When a
node wants to join in the system, it checks the pending nodes
information of the latest block and finds an occupation that
TABLE 2. PoW for pending node.
TABLE 3. Nodes in the system.
TABLE 4. PN list.
TABLE 5. Nodes in the system after adding.
is less affluence in number. It then claims that occupation.
Let there be a threshold PoW difficulty P. The node needs
to present a PoW of a P × s difficulty to the system before
this node’s info (the occupation and a public identity key)
is written into the pending node section. Table 2 shows the
structure of this PoW. Until the node has been instructed
to store a specific blockchain segment, the node needs to
additionally present a P difficulty PoW (of the same content)
in every iteration of the mining game to the system to keep
the spot in the pending node section.
Rank the nodes’ info by the time their info is written into
the pending section in ascending order into a listPN . LetPNi,j
refers to the index j pending node of the occupation i. Every
time when min(len(PNi)) >= 10, i ∈ [1,m], the storage
of all nodes is re-assigned while the size of the blockchain
segment is readjusted and 10 more blockchain segments are
created (s = s + 10) and PNi,1..10, i ∈ [1,m] are added to
the system. Table 3 and 4 shows an example of the nodes in
the system and the PN list; Table 5 and 6 show a possible
situation of the nodes in the system and the PN list when the
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TABLE 6. PN list after adding.
front 10 elements of every occupation in the PN list (Table 4)
are added to the system. Because there is a queue for the
pending nodes in every occupation, it is nature for the nodes
to claim an occupation that is less affluence in number to join
in the system quicker. In this way, we solve the challenge (1)
of segment blockchain.
D. STORAGE ASSIGNMENT
When new nodes are added to the system right after block
height h, let IDi,j refers to the identity key of the node of
occupation i which stores j blockchain segment. Create a
RIDi,j = IDi,j hash BHh (9)
link RIDi,j with IDi,j and rank RIDi, i ∈ [1,m] by the
ascending order, then adjust IDi according to the sequence of
the ranked RIDi. BHi is the hash of the block i, hash is a hash
function that returns an 256 bits integer. After the procedure
above, the assignment is completed. In this way, we solved
the challenge (2) of segment blockchain.
E. PROOF OF STORAGE
Let every block header records the Merkle root of the trans-
actions embedded in the block. Let BHh be the block header
hash of the latest block height (block height h). If the node j
in occupation i stored the blockchain segment k , then let
CIk = (BHh hash IDi,j hash i) mod len(k)+ 1 (10)
where CIk is the index number of a transaction in blockchain
segment k , len(k) is a function that returns the number of
transactions inside the blockchain segment k .When the nodes
present the evidence of storing the blockchain segment k at
the block height h (referred to as Proof of Storage), it should
provide
• The transaction which CIk refers to.
• A Merkle branch that can derive the Merkle root indi-
cated in the block header of a block B in the blockchain
segment k .
• The transaction which CIk refers to is inside block B.
Figure 3 shows an example of the Proof of Storage. In this
way, we solved the challenge (3) of segment blockchain.
F. MINING AND BLOCKCHAIN SEGMENT SIZE
ADJUSTMENT
Segment blockchain runs the same mining rule as Nakamoto
blockchain for the block creation. Nakamoto blockchain rules
that the node which presents a valid block with the most
FIGURE 3. The example of a transaction Merkle tree of block i . Let
len(i ) = 4, CIi = 3. The Merkle branch for Proof of Storage contains all
the nodes in red.
FIGURE 4. A mining procedure example. There are three occupations
(red, yellow, green); S rectangle represents proof of storage; W rectangle
represents a PoW.
TABLE 7. PoW for nodes who are required to store blockchain segment k .
difficult PoW in an iteration wins that iteration of the mining
game.
Let there be s number of blockchain segments existing in
the system, and the current block height is h. Then, the nodes
who were assigned to store the number k = (h mod s) + 1
blockchain segment should send the Proof of Storage to the
network after the block of the block height h is created. They
need to submit aPoW ofP×s difficulty alongside theProof of
Storage. Table 7 shows the structure of PoW for these nodes.
The information of the nodes which stored blockchain seg-
ment k and presented Proof of Storage and PoW is embedded
in the block of the second next block height. Figure 4 shows
an example of this procedure.
When a node which stores the blockchain segment k ,
k = (h mod s)+ 1 does not present the Proof of Storage and
the fulfilledPoW at the block height h, themembership of this
node is eliminated after the block height h+2. If this node is of
occupationX , and there is a pending node inPNX , thenPNX ,1
replaces the eliminated node. If there is no pending node in
PNX , then s = s−1, the number of blocks in every blockchain
segment is adjusted accordingly. After that, all nodes storing
the blockchain segment k before the adjustment are back to
the pending node section. In this way, we solve the challenge
(4) of segment blockchain.
G. STORAGE ADJUSTMENT DELAY
When h//s is changed, the components of every segment is
changed. Because of that, nodes need to adjust the segments
they store by adding or deleting blocks, and sometimes it also
needs to derive a new state from the old one. For example,
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in Figure 2, when s changed from 2 to 3, blockchain seg-
ment two would contain ‘‘State 1’’ instead of ‘‘State 2’’. The
nodes store segment two would need to derive the State 1 by
acquiring segment one and execute blocks since ‘‘State 0’’.
It is required that the nodes need to keep the old version of
their segments for one block iteration after h//s is changed to
avoid conflicts between different versions of segments. In this
way, it is providing time for nodes to change the segments
smoothly.
H. REWARD
There are two parts of reward in segment blockchain, one for
creating a block, one for keeping the blockchain segments.
The reward for creating the block is given using the same
rule as Nakamoto blockchain (the reward starts from a large
amount of currency at first, and cut in half in every fixed
time window until reaching zero). The reward for keeping the
blockchain segments is given using the following rules:
• When a node showed the Proof of Storage and the ful-
filled PoW in the block height h, the reward is given to
this node at the block of the block height h + 2 (using
the node’s public identity key as the wallet address).
• The reward is equally divided to every node.
• The amount of the reward for every iteration comes from
the system (as like the Nakamoto blockchain). After the
reward from the system goes to zero, the reward then
comes from the transaction fees.
I. POWER CONSTRAIN
As every node which stores the data are required to present
P× s amount of difficulty per s block height, the node should
at least be able to generate a P difficulty PoW per iteration.
We say the node which can generate P difficulty PoW in
one iteration has P power. Let s = 1, and there is n × P
amount of power globally. The Adversary who has (n/2)×P
amount of power can only keep n/2 of nodes in a system
of n nodes because it needs to place P amount of power for
every Adversary node. If s > 1, every node still needs place
P amount of power to maintain the spot in the system in every
iteration. Otherwise, the Adversary node will be expelled at
the next time window (the time window is sized s) for not
being able to provide a P× s difficulty PoW. If an Adversary
who has P amount of power stop placing power for its node A
and tries to gain a new node B, A and B cannot remain in the
system at the same time. This is because B also needs P×s of
power in order to become a pending node. Thus, regardless of
the number of s, for an Adversary who has (n/2)×P amount
of power, it can only keep n/2 of the nodes.
IV. COMBINING N/2 BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING WITH
SEGMENT BLOCKCHAIN
For blockchain sharding approaches, nodes only store trans-
actions in their shards, so that the storage globally is also
divided. However, since blockchain sharding approaches aim
to process the transactions in different shards in parallel
to improve the transaction per second globally, the system
is requiring the honest nodes to be the majority of every
shard. As a result, the number of shards that the trans-
actions as a whole can be divided into, in blockchain
sharding approaches, is much smaller than the number of
Segments that the transactions can be divided into in Segment
blockchain.
For an n/2 blockchain sharding system which uses Seg-
ment blockchain, the nodes keep the latest state in their shards
and store different segment of the blockchain (the segments
may or may not be one that contains blocks within the nodes’
shards). We need to consider two failure probabilities in this
system: the chance for the Adversary to control a shard and
the chance for the Adversary to take all the copies of a
segment. Since the two attacks are unrelated, the maximum
failure probability Prmax for a blockchain sharding system in
overall is
Prmax = max(Prshardmax ,Prstoragemax ) (11)
We know that
Prshardmax = (
AD
T × S )
T (12)
and
PrStoragemax =
1
2
m
(13)
Let
Prmax >= [( ADT ∗ s1 )
T ≈ 1
2
(n/s0)
] (14)
where 0.5 ∗ n/s1 < T <= n/s1, T is a pre-defined setting 1
We can use equation 14 to calculate the maximum number
of shards s1 required for the n/2 blockchain sharding approach
to function securely and the maximum number of segments
s0 the Segment blockchain embedded to the system can have
in order to maintain the same security threshold Prmax .
Let AD = n2 (this is the maximum AD, because if exceed
this number the Adversary would be the majority). Then,
we can derive:
s0 = − n× log(2)log(2−T × ( ns1×T )T )
(15)
Assumed we set the maximum failure probability to be
Prmax = 10−6 (this bounds the number of s1), then we derive
S0
S1
which is shown in Figure 5.
As the data in Figure 5 suggested, the blockchain can be
divided into S0S1 more times of segments than shards, so that
the nodes can store a much smaller number of blocks than
store all the blocks of a shard. Thus, if a blockchain sharding
system separates the transaction storage from transaction
verification by embedding a segment blockchain, the stor-
age requirement for an individual node can be reduced
significantly.
1The smaller the T is, the less secure a shard is, the larger the T is,
the easier a shard can be halted by the Adversary [18].
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FIGURE 5. s0/s1.
FIGURE 6. Segment blockchain data requirement.
V. DATA REQUIREMENT
Let a record in State sized 41 bytes (a wallet address sized
33 bytes, the balance of a wallet address sized 8 bytes). Let a
block of the Nakamoto blockchain sized SB bytes, a block
of segment blockchain sized SB + SizePending node section.
A record in Pending node section sized 68 bytes (4 bytes for
the occupation of this node, 32 bytes for the public identity
key and 32 bytes for the PoW it demonstrated). In reality,
we can use persistent data structure [41] to store States. In this
way, the size of storage can be further reduced.
Figure 6 shows the data requirement for the segment
blockchain with different number of records in the State (let
SB = 1Mbytes, m = 256), and with the changes of the block
height h. Let there be 8000 nodes (the number of the Bit-
coin nodes currently), 256 pending nodes are in the pending
node section in every block. Figure 7 shows the differences
in the amount of data stored in a node in the Nakamoto
blockchain and the amount of data stored by a node in seg-
ment blockchain with the different number of accounts in the
state. Segment blockchain largely shrank the data required
while maintaining the full functions of Nakamoto blockchain.
As the analysis in Section 2 showed, the chance for the
Adversary who has 50% of the overall calculation power
FIGURE 7. Segment blockchain data requirement compared to Nakamoto
blockchain data requirement.
to store all the copies of a block is 12
m
. When m = 256,
the security of segment blockchain reached the security level
of the standard public-private encryption systems. It is very
safe to use anm = 256 segment blockchain to power financial
systems because the encryption systems of the same security
threshold are already widely tested by the public and used in
many online banking systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed an approach to reduce the stor-
age requirement of the blockchain system while keeping
the decentralisation without compromising the security of
the blockchain. The data analyses proved that segment
blockchain largely reduced the data requirement compared to
Nakamoto blockchain. Thus, it is of more advantage to using
segment blockchain to power data-heavy blockchains.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto, ‘‘Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,’’ Working
Papers, 2008. [Online]. Available: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
[2] Bitcoin Cash Charts. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.Bitcoin.com
[3] V. Buterin, ‘‘A next-generation smart contract and decentralized applica-
tion platform,’’White Paper, vol. 3, p. 37, Jan. 2014.
[4] C. D. Clack, V. A. Bakshi, and L. Braine, ‘‘Smart contract tem-
plates: Foundations, design landscape and research directions,’’ 2016,
arXiv:1608.00771. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.00771
[5] A. Savelyev, ‘‘Contract law 2.0: ‘Smart’ contracts as the beginning of the
end of classic contract law,’’ Inf. Commun. Technol. Law, vol. 26, no. 2,
pp. 116–134, 2017.
[6] N. Rota andM. Thonnat, ‘‘Activity recognition from video sequences using
declarative models,’’ in Proc. ECAI, 2000, pp. 673–680.
[7] W. Samek, T. Wiegand, and K.-R. Müller, ‘‘Explainable artificial
intelligence: Understanding, visualizing and interpreting deep learn-
ing models,’’ 2017, arXiv:1708.08296. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.
org/abs/1708.08296
[8] D. Larimer, ‘‘Delegated proof-of-stake (dpos),’’ Bitshare whitepaper,
Apr. 2014.
[9] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak, and P. Gauravaram, ‘‘Lsb: A lightweight
scalable blockchain for iot security and privacy,’’ 2017, arXiv:1712.02969.
[Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.02969
17440 VOLUME 8, 2020
Y. Xu, Y. Huang: Segment Blockchain: Size Reduced Storage Mechanism for Blockchain
[10] D. Gruber, W. Li, and G. Karame, ‘‘Unifying lightweight blockchain client
implementations,’’ in Proc. NDSS Workshop Decentralized IoT Secur.
Stand., 2018, pp. 1–7.
[11] O. Schrijvers, J. Bonneau, D. Boneh, and T. Roughgarden, ‘‘Incentive
compatibility of bitcoin mining pool reward functions,’’ in Proc. Int.
Conf. Financial Cryptogr. Data Secur. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016,
pp. 477–498.
[12] Y. Lewenberg, Y. Bachrach, Y. Sompolinsky, A. Zohar, and
J. S. Rosenschein, ‘‘Bitcoin mining pools: A cooperative game theoretic
analysis,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Auto. Agents Multiagent Syst., 2015,
pp. 919–927.
[13] S. Khatoon and N. Javaid, ‘‘Blockchain based decentralized scalable iden-
tity and access management system for Internet of Things,’’ Working
Paper, 2019.
[14] J. Poon and T. Dryja, ‘‘The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable off-
chain instant payments,’’ Working Paper, 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
[15] J. Eberhardt and S. Tai, ‘‘On or off the blockchain? Insights on off-
chaining computation and data,’’ in Proc. Eur. Conf. Service-Oriented
Cloud Comput. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017, pp. 3–15.
[16] M. Zamani, M. Movahedi, and M. Raykova, ‘‘Rapidchain: Scaling
blockchain via full sharding,’’ in Proc. ACM SIGSAC Conf. Comput.
Commun. Secur., 2018, pp. 931–948.
[17] E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly, E. Syta, and B. Ford,
‘‘OmniLedger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding,’’ in
Proc. IEEE Symp. Secur. Privacy (SP), May 2018, pp. 583–598.
[18] Y. Xu and Y. Huang, ‘‘An n/2 Byzantine node tolerated blockchain shard-
ing approach,’’ in Proc. 35th ACM/SIGAPP Symp. Appl. Comput., 2020.
[Online]. Available: http://gofun.online/document/blockchain_sharding.
pdf
[19] Bitcoin Developer Guide. Simplified Payment Verification (SPV). [Online].
Available: https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide
[20] P. Vasin, ‘‘Blackcoin’s proof-of-stake protocol v2,’’ Working Papers, 2014.
[Online]. Available: https://blackcoin.co/blackcoin-pos-protocol-v2-
whitepaper. pdf
[21] S. Huh, S. Cho, and S. Kim, ‘‘Managing IoT devices using blockchain
platform,’’ in Proc. 19th Int. Conf. Adv. Commun. Technol. (ICACT), 2017,
pp. 464–467
[22] X. Fan and Q. Chai, ‘‘Roll-DPoS: A randomized delegated proof of stake
scheme for scalable blockchain-based Internet of Things systems,’’ inProc.
15th EAI Int. Conf. Mobile Ubiquitous Syst., Comput., Netw. Services-
MobiQuitous, 2018, pp. 482–484.
[23] C. Burchert, C. Decker, and R. Wattenhofer, ‘‘Scalable funding of bitcoin
micropayment channel networks,’’ Roy. Soc. Open sci., vol. 5, no. 8,
Aug. 2018, Art. no. 180089.
[24] C. Decker and R. Wattenhofer, ‘‘A fast and scalable payment network with
bitcoin duplex micropayment channels,’’ in Proc. Symp. Self-Stabilizing
Syst. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015, pp. 3–18.
[25] Y. Xu, ‘‘Section-Blockchain: A storage reduced blockchain protocol,
the foundation of an autotrophic decentralized storage architecture,’’ in
Proc. 23rd Int. Conf. Eng. Complex Comput. Syst. (ICECCS), Dec. 2018,
pp. 115–125.
[26] Q. Xu, K. M. M. Aung, Y. Zhu, and K. L. Yong, ‘‘A blockchain-based
storage system for data analytics in the Internet of Things,’’ in New
Advances in the Internet of Things. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018,
pp. 119–138.
[27] S. Wilkinson, J. Lowry, and T. Boshevski, ‘‘Metadisk a blockchain-based
decentralized file storage application,’’ Tech. Rep., 2014.
[28] D. Vorick and L. Champine, ‘‘Sia: Simple decentralized storage,’’ Nebu-
lous Inc, Boston, MA, USA, Working Paper, 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://assets.coss.io/documents/white-papers/siacoin.pdf
[29] S. Wang, T. T. A. Dinh, Q. Lin, Z. Xie, M. Zhang, Q. Cai, G. Chen,
B. C. Ooi, and P. Ruan, ‘‘Forkbase: An efficient storage engine for
blockchain and forkable applications,’’ Proc. VLDB Endow., vol. 11,
no. 10, pp. 1137–1150, Jun. 2018.
[30] J. Li, J. Wu, and L. Chen, ‘‘Block-secure: Blockchain based scheme for
secure P2P cloud storage,’’ Inf. Sci., vol. 465, pp. 219–231, Oct. 2018.
[31] M. Ali, J. Nelson, R. Shea, and M. J. Freedman, ‘‘Blockstack: A global
naming and storage system secured by blockchains,’’ in Proc. USENIX
Annu. Tech. Conf. (USENIXATC), 2016, pp. 181–194.
[32] R. Dennis, G. Owenson, and B. Aziz, ‘‘A temporal blockchain: A for-
mal analysis,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Collaboration Technol. Syst. (CTS),
Oct. 2016, pp. 430–437.
[33] Y. Ren, Y. Liu, S. Ji, A. K. Sangaiah, and J. Wang, ‘‘Incentive mechanism
of data storage based on blockchain for wireless sensor networks,’’Mobile
Inf. Syst., vol. 2018, pp. 1–10, Aug. 2018.
[34] M. Bastiaan, ‘‘Preventing the 51%-attack: A stochastic analysis of two
phase proof of work in bitcoin,’’ Tech. Rep., 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://referaat.cs.utwente.nl/conference/22/paper/7473/preventingthe-
51-attack-a-stochasticanalysis-oftwo-phase-proof-of-work-in-bitcoin.
pdf
[35] M. Vukolić, ‘‘The quest for scalable blockchain fabric: Proof-of-work vs.
BFT replication,’’ in Proc. Int. Workshop Open Problems Netw. Secur.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015, pp. 112–125.
[36] J. R. Douceur, ‘‘The sybil attack,’’ inProc. Int. Workshop Peer-to-Peer Syst.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2002, pp. 251–260.
[37] O. López-Pintado, L. García-Bañuelos, M. Dumas, and I. Weber, ‘‘Cater-
pillar: A blockchain-based business process management system,’’ in
Proc. BPM (Demos), 2017. [Online]. Available: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-
1920/BPM_2017_paper_199.pdf
[38] Q. Dupont, ‘‘Blockchain identities: Notational technologies for control
and management of abstracted entities,’’ Metaphilosophy, vol. 48, no. 5,
pp. 634–653, Oct. 2017.
[39] Y. Okazaki, ‘‘Unveiling the potential of blockchain for customs,’’ WCO
Res. Paper 45, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.wcoomd.org/-
/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/research/research-paper-series/45_
yotaro_okazaki_unveiling_the_potential_of_blockchain_for_customs.pdf
?la=en
[40] Y. Ren, Y. Leng, Y. Cheng, and J. Wang, ‘‘Secure data storage based on
blockchain and coding in edge computing,’’ Math. Biosci. Eng, vol. 16,
pp. 1874–1892, Jan. 2019.
[41] T. Kurosawa, M. Yoshimoto, S. Shibayama, and R. Uehara, ‘‘Method of
managing data structure containing both persistent data and transient data,’’
U.S. Patent 5 504 895, Apr. 2, 1996.
YIBIN XU (Student Member, IEEE) currently
pursuing the degree with the School of Com-
puter Science and Informatics, Cardiff University,
Cardiff, U.K.
YANGYU HUANG currently pursuing the degree
with the School of Electronic Engineering and
Automation, Guilin University of Electronic and
Technology, Guilin, China.
VOLUME 8, 2020 17441
